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Abstract
This review of Professor Marcos Cueto's Cold War Deadly Fevers: Malaria Eradication in Mexico,
1955–1975  discusses some of the historical, sociological, political and parasitological topics
included in Dr. Cueto's superbly well-informed volume. The reviewer, a parasitologist, follows the
trail illuminated by Dr. Cueto through the foundations of the malaria eradication campaign; the
release in Mexico of the first postage stamp in the world dedicated to malaria control;
epidemiological facts on malarial morbidity and mortality in Mexico when the campaign began; the
emergence of problem areas that impeded eradication; considerations on mosquitoes and malaria
transmission in Mexico; the role of business and society in malaria eradication; the results of the
campaign; the relationship between malaria and poverty; and the parasitological lessons to be
learned from the history of malaria eradication campaigns. Dr. Cueto's excellent and well-informed
exploration of malaria – not merely as a disease but as a social, economic and human problem –
makes this book required reading.
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The book
Cold War, Deadly Fevers: Malaria Eradication in Mexico,
1955–1975  is a historical account and analysis of the
World Health Organization's global malaria eradication
program as it unfolded in Mexico. The author, Marcos
Cueto, a historian and a professor in the department of
sociomedical sciences at the School of Public Health at the
Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia in Lima, reveals
with x-ray precision the structure underlying the global
effort to conquer malaria, launched in 1955; like a por-
traitist, he also shows the outer peculiarities this structure
assumed in specific locations.
Dr. Cueto vividly describes the experiences, policies, and
scientific beliefs on which the global malaria eradication
program was built. According to him, the United States
supported the program to increase its presence in Latin
America and other regions afflicted by malaria – less as a
public service than as a strategic blow to creeping commu-
nism, and even as a business opportunity.
Dr. Cueto's superbly well-informed exploration of
malaria not only as a disease but as a social, economic,
and human problem makes his book required reading.
The only extant comparable work is El Paludismo en Amer-
ica Latina [1], published from a thesis written by Dr. Saul
Franco-Agudelo to obtain his master's degree in social
medicine at the Universidad Metropolitana of Mexico
City.
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As a Mexican parasitologist dedicated for many years now
to the study of malaria parasites, I found Dr. Cueto's excel-
lent book especially exciting. Think of these comments as
a trailer for the book, which gives its reader a front-row
seat for the unfolding of malaria eradication in Mexico.
Foundations of the malaria eradication program
The history of malaria eradication in Mexico and the
world is the story of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane
(DDT), a compound first synthesized in 1874. It had no
known application but was resynthesized in 1939, at
which point it was recognized as an effective insecticide.
DDT was used during the Second World War to control
lice, fleas, and mosquito-transmitted diseases, and it was
soon established as the most useful tool for controlling
insect vectors of public health importance. DDT cam-
paigns successfully controlled malaria in Europe. Its effec-
tiveness encouraged the notion that malaria could be
entirely eliminated across the globe. When the war ended,
DDT was commercialized and made part of malaria con-
trol programs in various tropical countries, including
Mexico.
The WHO Eighth World Health Assembly, held in Mexico
City in 1955, approved the global malaria eradication
campaign. This program was to be carried out in Europe,
North Africa, the Middle East, some Asian countries, and
Latin America. Sub-Saharan Africa was deemed "not
ready" [2] and excluded from the supposedly "global" ini-
tiative, which therefore ignored the territories that pro-
duced 90% of the malaria cases and deaths in the world at
that time. This statistic bears repetition: the countries that
produced just 10% of earth's malaria infections were the
only ones with which the global malaria eradication pro-
gram concerned itself. The program succeeded in driving
malaria out of southern Europe, North Africa, the Middle
East, and some islands in the Atlantic Ocean. India and Sri
Lanka almost eliminated malaria, but then it returned dra-
matically.
At the World Health Assembly in 1955, Latin American
governments agreed to finance the campaign for five
years, the amount of time WHO had deemed sufficient for
eradication. Altruistic US funds (administered through
UNICEF and what was then called the Pan American San-
itary Bureau, today the Pan American Health Organiza-
tion) were the fuel that got the campaign going in Latin
America.
But in 1960 not one of the countries of continental Latin
America was free of malaria. The campaign was extended.
By 1966, it looked as if Mexico might achieve eradication,
but by 1970 that promise was shown to be false. Even
after WHO dissolved its global efforts, Mexico's campaign
went on until 1986, by which time malaria had once more
spread throughout its original area of incidence and
malaria morbidity had reached an alarming 140,000
cases. But eventually all countries gave up on eradication
and implemented programs to control malaria, using the
instruments and techniques left over from the era of erad-
ication. Today, Mexico officially reports from one to three
thousand cases annually.
DDT's efficacy during and after the Second World War
made global malaria eradication seem feasible; this con-
viction was further supported by the following experi-
ence-based assumptions:
1. Malaria transmission occurs at night inside human
dwellings, where anopheles mosquitoes bite people to
feast on their blood.
2. Anopheles mosquitoes remain within human dwell-
ings after sucking blood and rest on their interior walls.
3. Malaria parasites have a finite lifespan in human hosts,
if treatment is not administered and infection is left to run
its natural course. Plasmodium falciparum die in six months
to one year; Plasmodium vivax survive inside human beings
for one to one and a half years (and sometimes more);
and humans can host Plasmodium malariae for 10 to 40
years or until they themselves die. Finally there is Plasmo-
dium ovale, which is no concern of ours because this spe-
cies has not been demonstrated to exist in the Americas.
4. The application of persistently-acting insecticides to a
house's interior walls is sufficient to interrupt malaria
transmission.
5. If transmission were interrupted for just three years
(later upped to five), malaria would be eradicated.
6. The spraying must be done as quickly as possible,
before mosquitoes develop resistance to insecticides.
Theoretically, what could be expected if these assump-
tions prove to be true?
When insecticide spraying began in these communities,
they were home to adult mosquitoes (in the air) and to
larval mosquitoes (in nearby bodies of water). The plan
was to spray the walls of every single house. Mosquitoes
in search of a place to rest after sucking human blood tend
to land on the walls of dwellings, and all mosquitoes that
landed on sprayed walls would die. Female mosquitoes –
the ones that suck blood, and therefore the ones that
transmit malaria – do not feed every day; they take a meal
every third or fourth day in order to lay eggs. They do not,
of course, all choose to feed on the same night, but it
could be reasonably supposed that all adult female mos-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/15
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quitoes would feed on blood at least once over the course
of a week. Thus, within a week of commencement of
spraying, all mosquitoes that were adults on day one
would have fed and then died after coming into contact
with a sprayed surface.
Once the adult mosquitoes were dead, however, the biting
would not have ended for good, since immature mosqui-
toes, unaffected by the spraying, would eventually reach
the adult stage and begin their own quest for blood. Each
egg present on water bodies at commencement of spray-
ing would develop through five larval stages and one
pupa, from which the adult hatches. This process takes
about 20 to 30 days at tropical temperatures, so within 30
days a new anopheles mosquito population would
emerge. (There should be no eggs laid after commence-
ment of spraying, since spraying would terminate extant
adult mosquitoes before they could lay eggs.) This new
population would die as its forbears did, on the sprayed
walls of houses they had entered in search of a meal of
human blood.
If the assumption was correct, then about 30 days after the
first DDT spraying the mosquito population would be
eliminated and transmission would be interrupted, with
no females at any stage of development left to transmit
malaria. Sprayed insecticide would remain potent for five
months even without further spraying, which would take
care of any mosquitoes that had escaped death. Once
female mosquitoes were eliminated, the only source of
malaria parasites would be the blood of people who were
already infected when the eradication campaign began.
Insecticide spraying coupled with antimalarial treatment
should have eradicated malaria in one or two months. The
WHO campaign manual for the eradication of malaria did
not call for treatment, however; instead it recommended
five full years of spraying, during which time all parasites
would die naturally inside their human hosts.
Why wasn't treatment administered to people with
malaria as their houses were sprayed, when this combina-
tion would, theoretically, have eliminated a community's
parasite population in just thirty days, setting the stage for
eradication maintenance? According to Dr. Cueto, Mexico
and other countries were familiar with DDT since 1945
on, first sprayed experimentally and later routinely used
in malaria control campaigns and, that is why there was a
big push within WHO to start the campaign before the
mosquitoes developed resistance to the insecticides: once
they developed resistance, it was thought, eradication
would be impossible. Why wasn't treatment administered
along with the spraying? Because WHO thought spraying
was enough, and more efficient than treatment? Because
spraying without treatment would allow malaria to linger
and the insecticide manufacturers to do more business?
We cannot say.
In any event, many of the eradication campaign's initial
assumptions turned out to be wholly or partially incor-
rect, and Dr. Cueto describes a host of other unforeseen
troubles that plagued its efforts. What is clear today is that
the failure to provide treatment to people suffering from
malaria was inhumane.
The mosquito postage stamp
Dr. Cueto recreates Mexico's atmosphere in the years prior
to the eradication campaign. As part of this atmosphere,
in 1938 the Mexican government had decided to make
malaria a national priority (at least the second time it had
done so), establishing the Comision de Saneamiento
Antimalarico and funding it with 15% of the Ministry of
Health's total budget [3]. But these good intentions were
never realized, and the Commission actually operated
with much more limited funding. Everyone wanted to
solve the malaria problem, but there wasn't enough
money to do so. Out of this abundance of enthusiasm and
dearth of financing came a postage stamp dedicated to
malaria control; its sale would raise funds for Commis-
sion operations [4]. The stamp known as the timbre del
mosquito (the mosquito postage stamp) came out in 1939;
it was the first postage stamp in the world dedicated to
malaria control [5]. As seen in figure 1, the stamp was
worth 1 Mexican cent. Printed in Prussian blue, it shows a
kneeling, bare-chested man raising his arms and curling
his fingers, as a gigantic mosquito bites him. Man at the
mercy of mosquito: an accurate description of how people
felt about malaria at that time (see Figure 1).
Establishing a base line
In order to measure the progress of the malaria eradica-
tion campaign, some figures on malaria morbidity and
mortality in Mexico had to be established before opera-
tions commenced. Different estimates existed, but the
most widely accepted at the time was a figure of 2 to 2.5
million cases of malaria per year with an annual mortality
of 25,000 persons [6,7].
These numbers, however, do not hold up to analysis. It is
evident that those 2.5 million supposed malaria cases
were not diagnosed on parasitological or clinical grounds.
Malaria diagnoses rely on the clinical skill of physicians,
and at that time there were only around 16,000 doctors in
all of Mexico, most of whom practiced in major cities.
Most malaria cases, on the other hand, occurred in small
towns or villages in rural tropical areas, where there were
few if any physicians. Diagnoses were not commonly
based on the evidence of parasites in the patients' blood.
So who was diagnosing malaria, if we know that physi-
cians were not where the malaria was? These must havePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/15
Page 4 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
been postmortem diagnoses, made with neither autopsies
nor licensed physicians. It was the civil servants in small
towns who would record deaths; they would ask relatives
for the cause of death or would invent one if necessary.
Malaria had about 22 different popular names through-
out Mexico: yellows, fevers, fever between body and flesh,
spleen fever, colds and fever, intermittent fever, chauiste
(a Nahuatl word, originally referring an ill plant that
develops black spots in its leaves, perhaps from a fungal
infection. Chauiste falls on humans in the form of ill tid-
ings or disease), etc. [8]. When these records were submit-
ted, the names assigned to the causes of death had to be
translated by the Ministry of Health, where, in each case,
an expert would decide what the popular name chosen by
the local civil servant meant in medical terms and thus
produce the official final diagnosis. With this diagnostic
technology, 25,000 annual deaths for malaria were
recorded previous to 1955. Morbidity was projected from
the number of deaths, based on the assumption that one
person would die out of every hundred people infected:
2.5 million cases.
This reckoning accounted only for the most deadly Plas-
modium species, P. falciparum. But according to the recog-
nized pathogenicity of the four Plasmodium species that
thrive in humans, P. malariae, the most benign, almost
never kills its host (unless he or she develops a complica-
tion); and P. vivax and P. ovale, though they can produce
very severe clinical states, are also considered benign, for
they usually do not kill their human host in the absence
of another disease (such as pneumonia). The only species
that kills its host singlehandedly, as it were, is P. falci-
parum. In 1958 when blood parasite estimations were
done, P. falciparum accounted for 14%, P. vivax for 85%
and P. malariae for 1% (rounded figures) of infected peo-
ple [9].
If there were, as estimated, 2.5 million true malaria cases,
the species breakdown should have been: P. falciparum
350,000;  P. vivax 2,125,000; and P. malariae 25,000.
Again using an estimated one death per 100 cases, the
total number of deaths should have been 3,500, which is
quite different from 25,000.
If there were really 2.5 million cases occurring annually
among 15 million inhabitants (people living in areas
affected by malaria), then one inhabitant in six was
infected before the campaign. After one year of the cam-
paign, one inhabitant in 150 was infected (calculated
from [9]); and five years into the campaign, only 25% of
the original malarious area (more than one million
square kilometers) was plagued by residual malaria [10].
We'll never know for sure how many Mexicans were
infected with malaria before the campaign. Therefore we
can never know how much of the decline in the official
number of malaria-infected people should be attributed
to DDT spraying and how much to initial overestimation
of the morbidity.
The problem areas
Dr. Cueto demonstrates that intervention plays out differ-
ently in different geographical regions; the methods that
succeed in one place will not necessarily work in others,
even within the same country. Soon after the campaign
began it became clear that the same eradication scheme
did not produce the same results everywhere. After five
years of insecticide coverage (1960), malaria had almost
been eliminated from the Gulf coast; along the Pacific cost
from Sinaloa to Chiapas, however, malaria was still being
transmitted in many areas [11]. One year later, a new
phrase was coined in Mexican eradication jargon, "prob-
lem areas," which referred to those regions where malaria
transmission persisted [12]. Later the term "problem
areas" came into use internationally.
Dr. Cueto points out that Mexico's problem areas were
also its poorest areas. They tended to have low but con-
stant malaria transmission, no matter what eradication
techniques were used (malaria treatment, larvicides, sani-
El timbre del mosquito Figure 1
El timbre del mosquito. Mexican postage stamp dedicated 
to malaria control.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/15
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tary engineering of mosquitoes' favored breeding places,
and insecticide fumigation of mosquitoes' outdoor
haunts); and most of them were villages built on river
banks or otherwise very close to rivers. Furthermore, the
expectation had been that the program, properly imple-
mented, would eradicate malaria in five years. When five
years passed and malaria had not been eradicated, demor-
alized eradication workers began to do their work slop-
pily. Thus, from the problem areas malaria could spread
once more throughout its old area of incidence, through-
out areas where it had supposedly been eradicated.
Mosquitoes and malaria transmission
Malaria parasites cycle from man to mosquito and from
mosquito to man without ever coming into direct contact
with the environment. A campaign aiming to stop malaria
transmission must find a way to measure the state of
transmission at any given moment in the communities
being sprayed. An indirect way is to measure the parasites
circulating among the community's people; the direct way
is to measure the parasites circulating in the stomachs and
salivary glands of the Anopheles mosquito population.
Estimations of the number of infected people in a com-
munity are usually based on the demonstration of malaria
parasites in the blood of subjects who are experiencing
febrile episodes or who have experienced such episodes in
the previous 30 days. But there are people who have
malaria but do not exhibit symptoms, and though they
are spreading their parasites to the mosquitoes that bite
them, they are not accounted for in the estimations from
febrile subjects. The only accurate way to quantify the
state of transmission is to measure malaria infection in the
mosquito population.
There are very few entomological studies of mosquitoes'
infectivity in Mexico's malarious areas. The Rockefeller
Foundation Archives dating back to even prior to the erad-
ication campaign show how some Mexican government
and Rockefeller Foundation officials felt about the cam-
paign's agendas regarding entomology and malaria.
Wilbur Downs, director of Rockefeller's malaria control
program in Mexico from 1946 – 1952, complained of the
Mexican government's tendency to undertake DDT cam-
paigns without first investigating the incidence of malaria
and of the principal anopheline vectors; on the other
hand, Fred Soper, perhaps the principal promoter of the
eradication campaign, believed that long-term, detailed
entomological or malaria studies would be necessary only
if DDT failed. Later a Mexican public health officer opined
that a DDT based malaria control program did not require
malariologists, engineers, or entomologists at all [13].
Records on mosquito entomological work in Mexico exist
since 1885, but as far as we know, (since Luis Vargas, the
entomologist of the eradication campaign did not men-
tion studies done on Anopheles mosquitoes infectivity in
his historical data on Entomology of Malaria in Mexico
[14]), it was not until 1955, when the National Comis-
sion for Malaria Eradication was created, that for the first
time systematic entomological studies on mosquito vec-
tors were carried out. Personal communications from the
campaign's entomologists reveal that malaria-infected
mosquitoes were uncommon but do not say anything
about the malaria transmission dynamics observed; and
so it seems that infected and infective mosquitoes were
casually studied but not in ways that ever became known
outside the campaign organization. This fact was exposed
in 1970 when the vocal executive of the malaria eradica-
tion campaign in Mexico proposed another Six Year Plan
to complete eradication [7]. The plan described explicitly
everything that needed to happen. Entomological studies
were required: anopheline density, antropophilia (man as
food source), endophilia (food taken inside man's
house), susceptibility to insecticides, longevity, and resist-
ance to insecticides. But there was no intention to deter-
mine sporozoite and oocysts rates in the vector
mosquitoes-that is, there was no intention to study the
infective forms. We know this was not an involuntary
omission since such studies had not been done in quite a
long time, and, if done, no one had published the results.
We might wonder how many other campaigns in Latin
America were skipping this important step.
Interesting malaria epidemiological work had been done
in Mexico in 1935 by Professor Bustamante [15] in
Xochimilco and adjacent villages. He employed classic
malariological procedures, including an entomological
study in which he established that Anopheles occidentalis
var aztecus (later referred as A. aztecus) was the chief
malaria vector (in the Valley of Mexico) of P. vivax, the
prevalent parasite species. This study observed infected
(oocysts in stomach) and infective (sporozoites in salivary
glands) adult mosquitoes by dissecting 200 mosquito
stomachs and 50 salivary glands. Data from these dissec-
tions were not included in the paper. The author defended
their omission, arguing that these observations were not
publishable because the technicians who had performed
the dissections were in the process of being trained. One
wonders now if any infected mosquitoes were found. If
there were no infected mosquitoes but there was malaria,
how could it be said that mosquitoes were the only possi-
ble transmitters of the disease? Could there be other
means of transmission, ones that might explain the exist-
ence of problem areas in which transmission persisted
even when the amount of DDT sprayed was doubled or
tripled and other interventions were employed? What
about the possibility of malaria transmission by mouth
[16]?Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/15
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Society and business in malaria eradication
Once upon a time two rival political and social orders vied
for global political and social domination. One, which
came to existence early in the twentieth century, declared
that it wanted to build a classless society in which no man
would be exploited by any other. This meant that private
property would eventually have to be abolished. Instead
of individual owners, all means of industrial production
would have a single faceless owner, the government,
which would distribute profits equally among all mem-
bers of society. The result, it was said, would be a truly
egalitarian society with no thieves, no poverty, and no
unemployment. This world was represented by just one
country, but this country had its satellites, and together
they were called the communist world or the second
world.
The other world was called the first world, since it had
been around since the Renaissance. In this world, the fam-
ily and the individual were the basic units of society, and
individual freedom was of paramount importance. Every
member of the society was free to own anything he could
afford and to be the boss of other people, thereby profit-
ing from their work. Men were limited only by their capac-
ities to accumulate. It was a world of competition, and
wealth in this world was unevenly distributed, for each
person took whatever he could earn or steal. There were
three classes: the rich, the middle class, and the poor. This
world emerged at more or less the same time in several
European countries, which went on to colonize and gob-
ble up many regions, countries, and cultures that until
then had had their own ways and social structures. This
was the capitalist world, and it exploited the poor nations
of the world even as capitalist bosses exploited the poor
workers within their own countries.
After the Second World War, the United States (the fore-
most representative of the first world) and the Soviet
Union (the leader of the second world) struggled for con-
trol of the earth's peoples. The goal of the first world in
this Cold War was to preserve its hegemony by encourag-
ing the development of capitalist countries and fighting
communism wherever it was to be found. The second
world's goal was to convert all poor countries to commu-
nism and thereby to bring an end to exploitation and pov-
erty. This is the atmosphere in which the global malaria
eradication program, a first world initiative, was
launched. Others have portrayed the vicissitudes of the
rise and fall of the malaria eradication campaign as a
struggle of strong personalities, idiosyncratic choices, his-
toric ironies, and unintended consequences [17]. By
2007, Dr. Cueto's characterization of this campaign in the
light of USA hegemony, an interpretation shared by other
authors, as is signaled by Stapleton [13], has substantial
and illuminating validity.
As it turned out, some citizens of the communist world
were more equal than others. Although some small pock-
ets of communism remained, most communist societies
returned to capitalism and individual liberties. As these
societies were crumbling back into capitalism, the malaria
eradication program was dying: WHO canceled it in the
1980s. Even when the worldwide malaria eradication pro-
gram died, national malaria control programs continued
their work and still work today.
Communism evaporated, the cold war came to an end,
and the previously balanced world was left with a single
hyperpower, the United States. The United States contin-
ued to push market freedom, tearing down frontiers
throughout the world – not for individuals but for goods
and capital. Monopolies came into being as big corpora-
tions engulfed smaller ones, creating tremendous hoards
of capital and power. Corporations dominated national
governments and thus the world in all its economic, cul-
tural, political and social expressions. Even in the former
Soviet Union, consolidation and power-grabbing were the
name of the game as oligarchs took control of what had
been the state's. Like the old communist superbosses,
giant corporations controlled the means of production;
under capitalism, however, these bosses gave no thought
to sharing profit with workers. These corporations made
sure their advocates were well placed within governments
and international organizations in order to influence pol-
icy decisions. Now corporations decided what citizens
should read, hear, see, and taste, how they should be edu-
cated and what social principles would govern them. This
is the story of the world we live in now, and its moral is
that given limitless liberty, a bewildered or uncompre-
hending people may choose to allow others to make their
choices for them without asking for their consent. Where
then is the land of liberty, if, at a personal or international
community level, the liberty of one is abolished for the
sake of the liberty of another?
But what was the role of malaria eradication in this story?
The malaria eradication campaign left a door open for The
United States to bring the third world of Latin America
into its fold during the Cold War, losing just one country,
Cuba. To eradication campaign operations the United
States contributed not cash but equipment and materials,
so the donated money was almost entirely returned to the
USA or never left (because donated money was largely
used in the USA to pay for malaria eradication technology
which was then exported). In most countries the amount
donated to support the campaigns did not cover all the
expenses. According to Dr. Cueto, Mexico received dispro-
portionately large support among Latin American coun-
tries, and yet from 1956 to 1964 the Mexican government
had to pay 75% of all the campaign expenses [3]. Mexico
and other Latin American countries had to make up thePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/15
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budget shortfall in order to implement the program by
buying American technology. After the first five years of
operation, American donations dwindled, and some years
later they wholly disappeared. At that point all countries
had to pay for 100% of their own programs even as they
continued to purchase malaria eradication technology
from the United States. Countries engaged in eradication
programs chose to continue in the same path for many
years rather than innovate; in fact, all those countries fight
malaria today with the same tools, barely modified.
Healthier local populations in malarious countries bene-
fit American companies operating there, so whatever help
the United States did offer could not be considered self-
less. The United States was selling a package of malaria
eradication technology and instructions for using it at a
cut rate – essentially buy one, get one free! – to create cli-
ents. The truth is that the US was, with only minimal
investment up front, opening a market for its products
that is still open today.
Buying and selling are facts of life in our modern world.
The seller gives the purchaser a good, and the purchaser
gives the seller some money. But if the good does not sat-
isfy the client, the seller should refund his money. And in
the case at hand, Mexico and Latin America were sold a
most unsatisfactory bill of goods.
The malaria eradication campaign did not eradicate
malaria, not in the time promised, and in fact not at all. In
the first world even health care and education are thought
of as consumer goods; so who's to say that malarious
countries do not have the right to demand a refund?
Because the transaction was disguised as humanitarian
help, the cheated states will never see a refund.
The future of malaria control intervention is population-
wide vaccination in malarious countries. We may also see
on the market satellite services that predict malaria epi-
demics and alert susceptible countries. None of this is
bad, but malarious countries should remember to keep
their receipts, even if it seems as if they're getting a good
deal.
The results
More than half a century has passed since the malaria
eradication campaign began in Mexico. The campaign and
the control program that followed it reduced malaria mor-
tality to zero; after ups and downs in morbidity, there
were 3819 cases in 2003, Dr. Cueto notes. The official
morbidity figures today are similar, and they are also quite
similar to the morbidity figures obtained at the high point
of the eradication campaign (1958–1959). Then everyone
believed that malaria was coming to an end. Now it once
again appears that eradication is succeeding and that the
end of malaria is at hand. If the currently accepted mor-
bidity rates are accurate, it would be reasonable to expect
malaria to be eradicated within a short time.
If eradication does occur, we will have to ask how much
of this success came as the result of DDT spraying and
other interventions, and how much was due to unrelated
economic and social changes. We might ask ourselves
what the malaria situation and socioeconomic picture
would look like today if the past fifty-one years had been
spent trying to eradicate not malaria but poverty, a cam-
paign that would have included environmental sanita-
tion, medical attention, employment programs, social
organization, and education.
Malaria and poverty
Poverty begets disease and disease begets poverty. As do
other diseases, malaria spins a vicious circle in which poor
people with malaria become poorer and therefore more
vulnerable to malaria. Malaria prospers most where
human societies prosper least [18].
What does poverty have to do with malaria, if malaria is
transmitted by mosquitoes? Mosquitoes do not discrimi-
nate between rich and poor; they'll bite anyone with
blood coursing through his veins. But the poor have poor
housing and thus are more exposed to mosquito bites.
Impoverished communities frequently become environ-
ments in which mosquitoes (not to mention pathogenic
bacteria, parasites and fungus) thrive. Caught in cycles of
unemployment and low-paying jobs, poor people gener-
ally have very few opportunities to improve their condi-
tions. Frequently their nutrition is very poor, leaving them
vulnerable to malaria and other diseases.
The Mexican experience with malaria eradication demon-
strated the connection between malaria and poverty. Even
the United States provides examples of this connection.
According to Professor Faust [19] the malaria east
endemic area was divided into two regions: one in the
Northeast, where winters are cold and summers are short
and periods of transmission are therefore limited; the par-
asite there is P. vivax. The other region is the hyperen-
demic south, where a subtropical climate allows for year-
round transmission of malaria by both P. vivax and P. fal-
ciparum. In the north, agricultural improvement and des-
iccation of mosquitoes' breeding places rendered malaria
sporadic, while in the south, where the population was
poorer, it is hard to say which interventions helped
decrease malaria infections. It was probably the combined
effect of a number of programs applied to boost the south-
ern economy, social services, and public health services.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/15
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Malaria is not only the result of a host-parasite relation-
ship. Environmental, economic, and social factors also
play important roles. Best results of insecticide spraying
are obtained in a relatively brief time if coverage is total,
but best results can only be obtained where socio-eco-
nomic indicators are better. This is because antimalarial
intervention alone can lead to a decrease in morbidity, but
it will only be temporary; morbidity will climb back up
when intervention is interrupted or diminished. Antima-
larial intervention must coincide with environmental,
economic and social improvements, or a chronic inter-
vention over the course of many years will be necessary
simply to preserve unstable initial benefits.
When chronic antimalarial intervention alone is applied,
it is possible that malaria will disappear eventually, after
many years. This is, however, not only the result of the
intervention, but also of the unrelated, naturally occurring
social evolution of communities, which at a certain point
removes the environmental, economic, and social ele-
ments that facilitate disease. The disease disappears when
antimalarial interventions are combined with permanent
environmental, social and economic changes in the
malarious communities.
Malaria control technologies themselves have barely
evolved. DDT is being used again in Africa, despite its
drawbacks.
If we want to vanquish malaria, our proper foe is not the
mosquito; it is poverty. Universal human rights to health,
food, and education are just words on paper and in
speeches today. We need to make these wordy dreams
into facts, for today the rights we like to think of as univer-
sal are simply out of reach for the world's poor.
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